The Efficiency of Decentralized Investment Management Systems by David S. Jones
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE EFFICIENCY OF DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENTSYSTEMS
David S. Jones
Working Paper No. 719




The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #719
July 1981
The Efficiency of Decentralized Investment Management Systems
ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that decentralized
investment management systems may not always be efficient. Specifically,
within the context of a particular portfolio choice paradigm it is shown
that a given decentralized investment management system is (weakly) efficient
if and only if the joint probability distribution of asset rates of return
satisfy certain covariance restrictions. If these restrictions do not
obtain then the asset portfolios generated by this decentralized structure
will generally be inferior to those which would be generated by a completely
centralized structure.
This paper also discusses how the managers of departments within an
efficient decentralized structure should behave so as to generate portfolios
which are optimal from the point of view of the institution as a whole.
Generally, departmental managers should behave as if they have less risk
aversion than the institution as a whole. In fact, a given manager should
be more risk averse the greater the value of his portfolio.
Finally, we note that the efficiency concept employed in this paper
is equivalent to the proposition that certain assets admit consistent simple
sum aggregation. It is shown that this implies that the efficient decen-
tralizationof investment decisions permits the institution to economize





(312) 492—5690THE EFFICIENCY OF DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
By David S. Jones
Introduction
Most large institutional investors have some form of decentralized
investment management system. Many of these systems take forms similar in
spirit to the hierarchical structure depicted in Figure 1. At each tier
in this structure a department committee or manager allocates the funds
entrusted to it among various subordinate departments. When investible
funds reach one of the departments along the bottom rung they are directly
invested into the individual assets under the purview of that department.
The solid lines in Figure 1 delineate the alternative channels by which
investible funds flow through the institution.
The departments in a decentralized investment management system
also tend to be informationally segmented in the following sense: each
department formulates its investment decisions solely on the basis of its
subjective assessment of the joint probability distribution of the rates
of return of the assets under its purview. Information concerning the
investment decisions or opportunities of departments specializing in other
assets is either not available or is not used.
In the present paper we will discuss the conditions under which
decentralized investment management systems of the above type are efficient.
Before defining the concept of efficiency that we shall employ in this
paper it will be useful to first describe the portfolio investment paradigm
which underlies our analysis.





































































































































































































































































































































































certain amount of funds to allocate at the beginning of a period. It
desires to allocate these funds among assets so as to maximize the expected
utility of its end—of—period wealth.i" Transactions costs associated with
the purchase and sale of assets are assumed to be nonexistent.
Our analysis also abstracts from information costs. That is, the
costs of acquiring and disseminating information about future asset rates
of return are taken to be zero. We also assume that the subjective joint
probability distributions of rates of return employed by the various
departments are consistent with one another. Thus, in Figure 1, the board
of directors, the equity department, and the domestic equity department all
have the same subjective joint probability distribution of rates of return
for domestic equities.
Within the context outlined above, the efficiency concept that we
have in mind is as follows: a given investment management structure is
efficient if for all information sets it gives rise to the same portfolio
allocation as would a completely centralized scheme in which all individual
investment decisions are made by the board of directors. Since we are
abstracting from information and transactions costs it is clear that there
is no reason for a decentralized structure to be preferred to a completely
centralized structure. Hence, the best a decentralized structure could
hope to accomplish is to replicate the investment decisions of a completely
centralized structure with the same information.
Since the existence of information costs is presumably a major reason
why decentralized investment management structures are adopted in practice,
2/ the reader may find it curious that we choose to abstract from them here.——4—
We do so in order to highlight as simply as possible an innate problem
with decentralized investment structures. To anticipate, such schemes
will normally generate inefficient portfolio allocations because the
informational segmentation inherent in these structures does not permit
individual departments to accurately assess the effects of their indi-
vidual actions on the "riskiness" of the institution's overall portfolio.
II. The Paradigm of Investor Behavior
Consider an institutional investor with wealthW0 to be allocated
among "k" assets at the beginning of a period. The institution desires to
allocate this wealth so as to maximize a utility function defined in terms
of the mean and variance of its portfolio's rate of return for the period.--"
That is, its objective is to choose the (kxl) portfolio share vector h
which maximizes the utility function
(1) u(p,a2) ;u1 >0; u2 <0
where i= thesubjective mean of the portfolio's real rate of return and
the subjective variance of the portfolio's real rate of return.
Denote the (kxl) vector of expected rates of return on the "k" alter-
native assets by r and denote the associated variance—covariance matrix
by Thenthe investor's portfolio choice problem can be formulated
mathematically as the following constrained maximization problem:
T— T
(2) maximize u(h r ,hh)
h
T subject to: 1 h =1
where 1 is an appropriately dimensioned column vector of ones.
For simplicity, in the analysis below we shall presume that the mean—
variance utility function u(i,2) takes the particular form:—5—
2 2
u(p,a )= p—(p/2)a
where the parameter "p" is the investor's relative risk aversion with respect
to wealth. While, in general, this parameter may vary with respect to the
other parameters of the problem, for simplicity, we shall take ?ItItobe a
constant below. That is, we shall assume that the investor displays constant
relative risk aversion. Thus, problem (2) becomes
(3) maximize hTr —(p/2)hTQh
h T subject to: ih= 1.
The specific utility function given above can be motivated or justified
in a number of ways. It can be interpreted as a first—order Taylor series
approximation to an arbitrary mean—variance utility function. Alternatively,
Friend, Landskronner, and Losq [1976] and Friedman and Roley [1979] have
shown that, under certain conditions, as holding periods become short the
solution to a constant relative risk aversion von Neumann—Morgenstern
expected utility (in terms of end—of—period wealth) maximizer's portfolio
choice problem tends to the solution to problem (8). Jones [1979] has also
shown that Lintner's [1972] lognormal securities market model of investor
behavior tends to (3) as the conditions needed for Lintner's approximations
to be exact are approached. Finally, under general conditions Merton's [1973]
continuous—time asset trading model for an investor with constant relative
risk aversion can be shown to imply that the investor continuously solves
the instantaneous portfolio choice problem (3) if r andare interpreted
as the instantaneous mean vector and variance—covariance matrix of a
Gaussian diffusion process which generates actual rates of return.—6—
III. The Efficiency of 2—Level Investment Management Systems
Before investigating the efficiency of multilevel management
structures like the 4—level structure depicted in Figure 1, it will prove
to be convenient to first examine the efficiency of 2—level structures like
that illustrated in Figure 2. To this end, partition the portfolio share
vector h into the "5"assetgroups implicit in the structure of Figure 2.





Itis straightforward to show that the portfolio share vector which
solves problem (3) ,h,is given by:
(5) h =(lip)Br +b
where B —(1/1T_l1)_l11TQ_l] and
b (1/1TQ—l1)-l1
By definition the optimal fraction of the investor's wealth allocated
to the th group of assets is 1T Thus, the optimal portfolio share
vector for the th department in the decentralized structure of Figure 2
is
(6) (l/iTh*)h*
where we recall that this department is constrained to invest only in the
assets under its purview (i.e., those of the 1th asset group).
















































































































































































of Figure 2, the only information available to the th department on which
to base its investment decisions is its subjective assessment of the joint
probability distribution of the rates of return of the group of assets.
Hence, in order for the structure of Figure 2 to be efficient, it must be
possible to express the quantity in (6) solely as a function of and Q...
That is, a necessary and sufficient condition for (strong) efficiency is
that there exist functions suchthat
(7) (l/iTh*)h* = fori =1,..'.,s
for all r and Q in the domain for which problem (3) is defined.
It is demonstrated in the appendix that g—functions satisfying the
restrictions in (7) generally do not exist for k>s>l unless the domains of
r and Q are restricted. Consequently, a given decentralized investment
management structure will generally only be efficient relative to a restricted
class of iand.Wealso show in the appendix that if r is permitted to
be unrestricted in Rk then g—functions satisfying (7) for k>s>l do not exist
regardless of the restrictions on the domain of .Sincethere is in practice
no a priori reason why expected yield vectors should be restricted to lie
in a lower dimensional subspace of Rk, this result would seem to suggest that
our present concept of (strong) efficiency is not very applicable to real
world situations.
It turns out, however, that if we permit departments to have one
additional bit of information, then we can find a limited class of Q for
which the structures in Figure 2 are efficient even if r is unrestricted in
Rk. The additional information that the 1thdepartment requires in order for
this weaker efficiency to obtain is the fraction of the institution's total—9—
wealth allocated to the 1th department (i.e., iTh*)Weak efficiency
is then equivalent to the existence of functions f.(.,.,.) such that
(8) (1/iTh*)h* =f.[.,Q..,lTh*] for i=l,...,s
for alland in the appropriate domain.
In the appendix we provide the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Suppose the domain of r is unrestricted. Then thelargest
class of nonsingular covariance matrices Q for which the decentralized
management structure in Figure 2 is (weakly) efficient is that in
which the covariance matrices .. (i#j)are of the form:
1,.J
= — 1cij; i,j1,...,s
where the c. are fixed vectors and the covariarice matrices 2.
.for —1
i=l,. .. ,sare unrestricted.'
Theorem 1 essentially states that the covariance matrices associated
with the partitioned Q matrix must assume the form in (9) in order for the
management structure in Figure 2 to be efficient for all values of r. The
covariarice parameter vectors c ,...,c must be constant if the f—functions
in (8) are to be stable functions of the ,Q.,and iTh*As the sufficiency
portion of the proof of Theorem 1 indicates, the function f. is parameterized
by c,. Hence, unless the c. are constant vectors the f—functions will not —1 —1
be stable in the above sense.
Several corollaries of Theorem 1 are readily apparent. First, if the
rates of return of the assets in each group are uncorrelated with those of
assets in all other groups, then the underlying 2—level management structure
is (weakly) efficient. This corresponds to the case for whichc. =0for
all "1"—10—
Another special case occurs when there are two groups of assets and one
of these groups contains a single asset. For such a partitioning of the assets
the associated covariance matri,
2'
will always be of the form in (9).2'
Hence, a decentralized 2—level investment structure in which one department
oversees a single asset while the other department oversees all the remaining
assets is always (weakly) efficient.
Finally, another special case, of limited interest, obtains when there
are "k" departments and each department has responsibility over a single asset.
Trivially, such a 2—level investment management structure is always efficient.
When condition (9) is satisfied the optimal portfolio share vector for
the 1th department in Figure 2 is given by:
(llTh*)
(10) v E(lTh)h=(I.lTh*) B. r. +b.-— 1
B. c. 1——1—1 p.——11 —1 —1 T * 1 —i
1 lh. ——1
(11) = 1
G.(r.—ic.) +g. T*i—i —1 —2
(p.'h.)1—1
whereB. = — (1/1TQ_l1) 1T-l
1 1,1 —1,1—1,1 1,1
b. =(1/1TQT11)T1.i
1 —1,1— 1,1—
C. E [_l —(lIlTTl.l)E.1. 1 lTz_l], 1 1,1 —1,1—1,1—— 1,1
g. E (l/1TE_ll) E.1.i ,and —1 —1,1— 1,1—
—1cJ —1T1 1,1 1,1 ——1 —1—
This expression, moreover, is easily seen to be the solution to the
following mean—variance portfolio choice problem:—11—
— * T (12) maximize v.(r.—pc.) —(p./2)v.E. .V. —1 —i —1 1 —1 1,1—1
V.
T
subject to:1 v. 1 ——1
where p =p.(iTh*)Thus, when the investment management structure of
Figure 2 is efficient, it is optimal for the manager of 1th department to
allocate his funds as if he is trying to solve the portfolio choice problem
in (12). That is, he should act as if his relative risk aversion is
and he is investing in a vector of assets with expected yield vector r. —
andvariance—covariance matrix E. ..Onlythen will his investment decision
1,1
be optimal from the point of view of the institution as a whole.
There are two interesting aspects to the portfolio choice problem (12)
and its solution (11). First, it is generally optimal for the department
manager to act as if he has less relative risk aversion than the institution
as a whole. This follows because p<p. in the likely event that iTh<l.
In fact, the appropriate relative risk aversion for the manager increases
linearly with the size of his department's portfolio: the more funds allocated
to his department, the more risk averse he should act. The basic reason for
this centers on the informational segmentation implicit in Figure 2.Since
there is usually more than one department, the risk of a particular depart-
ment's portfolio is being pooled with that of other departments. In particular,
if the of (9) are zero, then the th department's contribution to the
variance of the institution's overall portfolio is (1Th)2.Var{.} where
Var{.} is the variance of the real rate of return of the th department's
portfolio. Behaving in a less risk averse manner is one way in which a
department manager can compensate for this pooling effect if he desires to—12—
focus upon the variance of his ownportfolioin isolation. If is
collinear with 1, then his optimal portfolio will equal the sum of the
first two terms on the right—hand side of (ll).2"
In general, covariances between rates of return of assets in different
departments will not be so proscribed and allowances must be made for this
fact by the department managers. This is why when c. is not collinear with
1 it is optimal for the th manager to behave as if he is investing in an
artificial set of assets with mean vector and variance—covariance matrix
given by r —pc.and E.. as in (12). His doing so essentially contributes
the third term on the right—hand side of (11) to his optimal portfolio share
vector. Notice that as lTh* tends to unity or as -tendsto a vector collinear
with 1 this correction tends to zero.
When c. is collinear with 1 then the th department manager need not
pretend that he is investing in artificial assets. His portfolio choice problem
in this case is to:
maximize —(p/2)vQ. .v




subject to: v.1 =1 —1—
wherer and Q. .arethe "true" mean—vector and variance—covariance matrix —1 1,1
of the assets under his purview. Notice, however, that he must still adjust
(lower) his level of relative risk aversion relative to that of the institution
as a whole to compensate for the pooling effect described above.
Before extending Theorem 1 to multilevel investment management structures
like that in Figure 1, it is interesting to note that condition (9) is
equivalent to the requirement that the assets in each group within Figure 2—13--
admit consistent simple sumaggregation.A similar duality between the
conditions for decentralization and aggregation obtains in consumer choice
theory. This duality relationship will prove useful in Section V wherein
we demonstrate that within an efficient management structure the information
required by higher level departments in order to efficiently allocate funds
to subordinate departments is only a small subset of the information available
to these subdepartments. Efficient management systems thereby permit
information flows between departments and subordinate departments to be
economized.
IV. The Efficiency of Multilevel Investment Management Systems
We return now to the original focus of our study: to determine the
conditions under which multilevel decentralized managementstructures, like
that in Figure 1, are weakly efficient. An important result which we shall
employ to this end is the following lemma:
Lemma 1: A given multilevel investment management structure, F,
is efficient if and only if every 2—level structure formed by
concatenating nonoverlapping departments and subdepartments of
F is efficient.
To illustrate the use of this lemma,considerthe 4—level structure of Figure 1.
All told, there are 12 2—level structures which can be formed byconcatenating
departments and subdepartments with mutually exclusive asset domains. These
are displayed in Figure 3. Lemma 1 essentially says that the structure in
Figure 1 is weakly efficient if and only if each of the 2—level structures in
Figure 3 is weakly efficient.
The formal proof of Lemma 1 is tedious, but straightforward, and we shall-14-
Figure 3
THE 2—LEVEL STRUCTURES IMPLICIT IN THE 4—LEVEL
INVESTMENTMANAGEMENT SYSTEM DISPLAYED INFIGURE 1
1) Equities, Bonds, Mortgages
2) Equities, Bonds, Commercial Mortgages, Residential Mortgages
3) Equities, Government Bonds, Corporate Bonds, Mortgages
4) Equities, Government Bonds, Utility Bonds, Industrial Bonds, Mortgages
5) Domestic Equities, Foreign Equities, Bonds, Mortgages
6) Equities, Government Bonds, Corporate Bonds, Commercial Mortgages,
Residential Mortgages
7) Equities, Government Bonds, Utility Bonds, Industrial Bonds, Commercial
Mortgages, Residential Mortgages
8) Domestic Equities, Foreign Equities, Bonds, Commercial Mortgages,
Residential Mortgages
9) Domestic Equities, Foreign Equities, Government Bonds, Corporate Bonds,
Mortgages
10) Domestic Equities, Foreign Equities, Government Bonds, Utility Bonds,
Industrial Bonds, Mortgages
11) Domestic Equities, Foreign Equities, Government Bonds, Corporate Bonds,
Commercial Mortgages, Residential Mortgages
12) Domestic Equities, Foreign Equities, Government Bonds, Utility Bonds,
Industrial Bonds, Commercial Mortgages, Residential Mortgages—15—
only outline it here. The "necessity" part of Lemma 1 derives from the fact
that in our hypothesized world without transactions costs intermediate level
departments in a multilevel structure (e.g., the equity department in Figure 1)
function only to funnel the appropriate amounts of funds to their subordinate
departments. If the multilevel structure is efficient then the portfolio of
the institution as a whole would be invariant to whether funds are allocated
by the board of directors to the subdepartments among the bottom tier of the
structure directly or whether they are channeled to these subdepartinents via
intermediate departments. Hence, in order for a multilevel structure to be
efficient the structures obtained from it by eliminating arbitrary intermediate
and bottom level departments must also be efficient.
To prove the "sufficiency" portion of Lemma 1, simply note that if
all 2—level structures implicit in a given multilevel structure are efficient,
then any intermediate or bottom level department in the multilevel structure
possesses sufficient information to allocate its funds directly to the
individual assets under its purview. Hence, these intermediate departments
certainly have enough information to optimally allocate funds to subordinate
departments. Moreover, when funds reach a bottom level department, this
department also has sufficient information to optimally allocate funds among
individual assets. Hence, "sufficiency" obtains.
By employing Lemma 1, one may verify the weak efficiency of any specific
multilevel structure by using Theorem 1 to verify that each of the 2—level
structures implicit in it is efficient. The weak efficiency of a given multi-
level structure thus implies a set of covariance restrictions across asset
rates of return. These restrictions are found by applying Theorem 1 repeatedly—16—
to the 2—level structures implicit in the multilevel structure. Wehave
derived these implied covariance restrictions for the 4—levelstructure of
Figure 1. Figure 4 summarizes these restrictions by displaying therequired
structure of the covariance matrix of rates of return. In thisdiagram
underscores, "," denoteconstant vectors and the c•'s and c 's are —
1,3 1,]
scalars.For comparison, in Figure 5 we display the covariancerestrictions
implied by the efficiency of the structure displayed inFigure 2. Notice
that the efficiency of the multilevel structure inFigure 1 is a much more
restrictive proposition than the efficiency of that inFigure 2.
V. Efficiency and Consistent Simple Sum Aggregation OverAssets
As in the deterministic theories of production andconsumer choice,
there is an intimate relationship between theconcepts of efficient decen-
tralization and consistent simple sum aggregation. In orderto explicate
this relationship within the simplestcontext, let us first reexamine the
generic 2—level decentralized structure of Figure 2. It will be recalled
that, from Theorem 1, a necessary and sufficient condition for thisstructure
to be efficient is that the variance—covarjance matrix ofasset rates of
return satisfies the restrictions given in (9).In another paper, Jones
[1980], the author has shown that (9) is also bothnecessary and sufficient
for the universe of assets to admit consistentsimple sum aggregation
across each of the "s" asset groupings implicit in the structure ofFigure 2.
Hence, for a given 2—level decentralized structure, the notion of weak
efficiency is essentially equivalent to the requirement that the universe
of assets admit consistent simple sum aggregation withrespect to the natural




















































































































































































































































































































































































































There is a natural extension of this result to multilevel management
structures. To illustrate, consider the 4—level management structure
displayed in Figure 1 and recall that its efficiency is equivalent to the
proposition that each of the 2—level structures in Figure 3 is efficient.
This implies that the structure in Figure 1 is efficient if and only if each
of the simple sum aggregation schemes implicit in Figure 3 is consistent.
One useful implication of the above result concerns the choice of
aggregation scheme to be employed in a portfolio choice model. Suppose that
a multilevel management structure is efficient. Then all aggregation schemes
formed from the 2—level structures implicit in the multilevel structure are
consistent. That is, any one of them may be validly invoked. To a limited
extent, then, a researcher is free to choose the aggregation scheme so as to
simplify his task at hand.
The relationship between consistent simple sum aggregation and
efficient decentralizability also has implications regarding the information
which must be disseminated to departments in order for them to be able to
efficiently allocate their funds to subordinate departments. As Jones [1980]
makes clear, when a particular multilevel structure is efficient, it is not
necessary for each department to know the joint probability distribution of
yields on all assets within its purview. Rather, if the department's role
is merely to allocate funds among subordinate departments then substantially
less information will suffice. Specifically, this department can efficiently
operate knowing only the joint probability distribution of the yields on as
many "composite" assets as there are subordinate departments immediately below
it on the organization chart. The allocation of funds among these subordinate—20—
departments then may proceed as if the department were itself directly
investing funds among these few ttcomposicelt assets.---"
The yield index for the "composite't asset corresponding to the th
subordinate department is constructed in the following manner: First,
notice that efficiency implies that the covariance matrix between the 1th
and 1th subordinate departments takes the form —lcfor some vectors —1- —J
and c., where does not depend on "j."Next,define:
G. — — lc]
11,1 —1— —1
and =[C.1—(l/lTGll)G_1IITG_l]
where .. isthe variance—covariance matrix associated with the yields on 1,1
the assets within the purview of the 1th subordinate department. Then the
yield index for this subordinate department, .,isgiven by:
=1.(r.—pcj/(l E.l). 1 —1—i—1 —1—
The reader should refer to Jones [19801 for a more detailed discussion
and a derivation of this expression.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have endeavored to demonstrate that decentralized
investment management systems of the type described in Section I are not
always efficient. Specifically, within the context of the portfolio choice
paradigm employed in this paper, it is shown that a given decentralized
investment management system is (weakly) efficient if and only if the (sub-
jective) joint probability distribution of asset rates of return satisfy
certain covariance restrictions. If these covariance restrictions do not
obtain then, from the point of view of the institution as a whole, the asset
portfolios generated by this decentralized structure will generally be—21—
inferior to those which would be generated by a completely centralized
structure.
This paper has also discussed how themanagers of departments within
an efficient decentralized structure should allocate their funds soas to
maximize the "expected utility" of the institution as a whole.Generally
it is optimal for these managers to act as if they have less riskaversion
than the institution as a whole. In particular, the smaller is thedollar
amount of funds controlled by a given manager, the less riskaverse that
manager should act.
Finally, we noted that the efficiency of a given decentralized invest-
ment management structure is equivalent to the proposition that the universe
of assets admits consistent sum aggregation across certainasset groups.
This result was shown to imply that the decentralization of investment
decisions permits the institution as a whole to economizeon the information
which must be passed to higher level departments (e.g., the board ofdirectors
in our example) in order for them to be able to efficientlydischarge their
responsibilities.
Several shortcomings of the above analysis should be pointed out at
this juncture. First, the analysis abstracts from informationcosts. It
is likely that if such cost were included in the analysis, weaker conditions
for a given decentralized investmentmanagement structure to be "economically
efficient" would result.
Also, the generic decentralized investment structure probablypresumes
more informational and asset segmentation than is the case in real world
institutions: Departments overseeing disjoint assets in the real worldmay—22—
exchange some information concerning each other's investment opportunities
or investment decisions. Furthermore, in actual practice several depart-
ments may have the authority to invest in the same assets. For example, at
some institutions, most department managers have the option of investing in
a "cash" asset like deposits or Treasury bills. Efficiency for this latter
type of structure has been partially analyzed by Jones [1979]. Therein, he
derives a sufficient condition for the (weak) efficiency of 2—level invest-
ment management structures in which each department has the alternative of
investing in a set of assets specific to that department and in a riskless
asset which is the same across departments. This condition essentially
replaces condition (9) of Theorem 1 with the requirement that
(9) =0 for all i#j; i,j=l,. ..,s.—23—
FOOTNOTES
*1 wish to thank Vance Roley for his helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.
1/ While the actual utility function that we employ below is of the mean—
variance variety, it is motivated within an expected utility maximization
framework.
2/ A similar criticism may be directed toward the extensive literature on
decentralizability or budgetability within the theories of consumer demand
and production.
3/ Below, this paradigm is motivated within an expected utility maximization
framework.
4/ In the ensuing discussions,is always presumed to be nonsingular. This
assumption may be motivated by postulating the absence of default free indexed
bonds within an inflationary environment.
5/ Within the framework of Merton's [1973] saving—investment model this
result obtains if unexpected changes in the vector of instantaneous mean
rates of return is uncorrelated with the vector of unexpected actual
instantaneous rates of return. The portfolio problem (3) can also be shown
to result if the investor is assumed to have negative exponential von Neumann—
Morgenstern utility function defined in terms of portfolio real rates of return.
6/ As shown in Jones [1980], these covariance restrictions are essentially
equivalent to the requirement that the objective function in (3) is separable
in terms of the "s" asset groupings. In the language of Green [19641, this
means that a two—stage budgeting procedure would be consistent.
7/ This is because in this case l
2is one—dimensional.—24—
8/ This scheme is formally equivalent to a completely centralized manage-
ment system in which the board of directors itself directly invests funds
in individual assets.
9/ When c. is collinear with 1, B.c. =0. — —1 — 1—i —
10/To see how this fact economizes on information flows, consider a completely
centralized investment management structure and the structures depicted in
Figures 1 and 2. Suppose also that all are (weakly) efficient.
Within the completely centralized structure, the board of directors
must have knowledge of r and Q, involving a total of k(3+k)/2 independent
parameters. For k =100this number is 5150.
Within the context of the structure in Figure 2, the board of directors
requires knowledge of the mean vector and variance—covariance matrix associ-
ated with "s" composite assets. This involves only s(3+s)/2 independent
parameters. For s =10this number is 65.
Within the context of the structure in Figure 1, the board requires
knowledge of only nine independent parameters.
A similar economization of this information required by intermediate
and bottom level departments can be shown to result as the investment
management structure becomes more decentralized.—25--
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APPENDIX
Proofof Theorem 1:
Necessity: Problem (3) can be rewritten in terms of partitioned matrices as:
A.
T— T T
(Al) maximize [h. r, —(p/2)h.2. •h,] —(p12) E h. Q. .h.
i=l 1 1,1—1 i=l
,..., —l
ST
subject to: E 1 h. =1 --1 i=l
The first order conditions for this problem are:
(A2) —p..h.




whereis the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the balance sheet
constraint.
Equations (A2) and (A3) may be solved to obtain the optimal portfolio
T* sharesas functions of the 1 h.:—1
* — T* *
(A4) h.(lIp)B.r.+(1 h.)b.—B. •h. for il,...,s 1—i ——1 —1 1,J—J
where B. = — (1/1TQT11)QT111T—l1and 1 1,1 —1,1—1,1—--- 1,1
b.=(1/1TQ_l1)_11.
1 — 1,1—i,i—
Anecessary condition for (weak) efficiency is that for each "iT',
(l/iTh*)-beinvariant with respect to all perturbations in the r• (j=i)
which leave 1 h. unchanged. For simplicity set i=l and define
(A5) hE[1 ; ll l2; and BrB11B12
L2 [222 LB12—27—
From (A4) we have
T*) *
(A6) -2 =(l/p)B2+ (1 -2 -2 —B1Q11
where
B2[l (1/jTQ_l1)çl1)ç2_l 11Tç_l] and
(l/i''c 1)2 i.
Under the above notation we have
(A7) B1
=B1c21.









* — T* T* (A9) (I+BQ12B2Q12)h1 =(l/p)B1r1+ (1 h1)b1 —(l/p)B112B2r—(1—i h1)B1c212b2.
Thus, a necessary condition for (weak) efficiency is that thequantity
(AiD) B1Q12B2
T* be invariant with respect to all perturbations of-2 which leave (1 h1)
unchanged. From (5) it is seen that perturbingr2 by x leaves (iTh*) invariant
if and only if
(All) 1T =
Theset of x's satisfying this relation are the vectors in the columnspace of
the matrix
(A12) [I —(l/iTB2i)BiiTj
Thus, if we are to have
(A13) B1c212B2 =B1Q12B2(r2+ x)
for all x satisfying (All), then it must be true that
(Al4) {(l/1TB2 i)B 11T 1T =
[B1c12B2JT.—28—
However, since the first matrix in square brackets on the left—hand side of
this expression is symmetric and indempotent (i.e., an orthogonal projection
matrix) ,thisimplies that
(A15) B1212B2 =z1TB
for some vector z. Also, it is easily shown that, since the rank of B is
"k—i," B22 1O. Hence, upon postmultiplying (A15) by 1 and noting that




From the structures of B1 and B2, it is clear that allQ12 satisfying
(A17) must be of the form
(A18)l2 1T +
for some vectors and c.
Since our original choice of i=l was arbitrary, conditions analogous
to (A18) must hold for values of "i" different from unity. These conditions
when taken together imply that each Q.. takes the form
(A19) =T+ i
T
ij; i,j=l,. .. ,s
for some fixed vectors c and c. This is condition (9) in the statement of 1 —J
the Theorem.
Sufficiency: Sufficiency follows upon noting that if (9) holds, then
T* i —
(A20) (1/1 hjh. =( )B.r. +b.—(__——i)Bc —
.iTh1—]—1 T *
ih.
for each "i." Because c. is a constant vector, this implies that f—functions
satisfying (8) exist where f. is given by the right—hand side of (A20).
From (A20), it is also apparent why strong efficiency cannot obtain—29—
if the r vector is unrestricted in Rk and k>s>l. Ifstrong efficiency
obtained then it would be necessary that the right—hand side of (A20) be
independent of r. for all "1" and "j" (ti). This is impossible if the r•
are unrestricted since by suitably choosing the r•, lTh can be made to
achieve any desired value.
Q.E.D.